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Oftentimes, topics that might fall outside
of science’s remit seem to end up becom-
ing a part of it, sooner or later. This appears
to be the case of synthetic biology, a new
biological science (although some main-
tain that it is a form of engineering, or
treat it as such; Endy, 2005), which seems to
have become essential to the understanding
of living beings and their extreme manip-
ulation. I believe it to be a new form of
biology. In truth, synthetic biology has a
long history and, conceptually speaking,
may well have formed part of the inter-
ests and research efforts of our illustrious
predecessors throughout the first half of
the twentieth century and even earlier. In
any event, and broadly speaking, it may
be asserted that such efforts were prema-
ture and that the state of the science, at
that time, did not allow for progress, in
terms of the modification, creation, or re-
creation of organisms or parts thereof that
we have today. Now, it has rather come of
age, which is why I think of synthetic biol-
ogy as a young or new biological science
(Moya, 2014).
To a great extent, when you talk about
synthetic biology, what you are doing, first
and foremost, is making a statement of
intent, if not expressing your concern,
wish, or hope that any biological organ-
ism which this discipline might examine
should be completely under control, and
that it should not deviate even the slightest
bit from the role that has been ascribed to
it. Of course, if some achievements had not
already been made in the field of synthetic
biology, clinging to a mere statement of
intent would do little to further its chances
of survival in the future. If some sciences
make headway, it is because some of their
initial achievements thrust fame, aware-
ness, and recognition upon them, in the
eyes of the scientific community and the
rest of society. Here is where we start to get
to grips with wishes and hopes for these
new sciences and their potential. This is
what is happening with synthetic biology.
Fundamentally, the synthetic biologist
aspires to make manufactured biological
entities behave just as a car might, once
it has been put together on an assembly
line. The metaphor of the car is as valid
as that of any other mechanical entity, or
any other type of entity, with perhaps the
only condition being that they should all
be put together on an assembly line. A
car, effectively, begins to take shape on an
assembly line and ends up having a specific
physical form. It comprises many different
components and each one has a specific
function, as designated by the manufac-
turer. Together, its components combine
to form a mechanical entity that functions
in a pre-determined way because of prior
knowledge of the manner in which each
component works, and the manufacturer
puts them all together following a pre-
determined plan, so that the whole may
function as desired. Attempting to make
a manufactured biological entity function
in the same way as a car leads us to make
two relevant observations. To begin with,
there is the obsolescence of the entity, then
there is intervention in the entity itself. The
nature of these properties differs in cells
when they are compared to cars.
First, let us take a look at the ques-
tion of obsolescence. As everyone knows,
a car has a limited lifespan. Its constituent
parts, in particular those that are essen-
tial in order for it to run, become worn
down, inevitably, until the materials [from
which they are made] break down and
become altered through the contact of
some parts with others, or on account
of the various reasons for which the car
might cease to run. I refer not to the
failure of the car to run, on account of
damage incurred following an accident,
but quite simply to wear and tear, render-
ing it unable to perform the purpose for
which it has been intended. To what degree
might this metaphor apply to the biolog-
ical entity, in general, and the synthetic-
biological entity, in particular? In truth,
the following question might be asked,
equally, of the biological entity and the
car. Might it suffer some type of wear
and tear that causes it either to stop func-
tioning or to function in a different way
before, for example, reaching the culminat-
ing point of its division or reproduction?
In other words, before it can reproduce
itself? This is, in effect, the case. Let us
take, for example, an individual biological
entity; a microorganism or a cell from a
multicellular organism which, on account
of its specialization, could be a germ cell –
the purpose of which is the reproduc-
tion of the organism – or a non-germ
cell, which will subdivide through mito-
sis, creating copies of itself. In the case of
the microorganism, or the non-germ cells,
there comes a point at which they divide,
producing two genetic copies of them-
selves; however, up until that point, they
have undergone transformation processes,
ending with metabolism, that have altered
them in relation to what they might have
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become in the moment that they were
generated by their respective parent cells.
It is generally believed that it is only at
the point of division (reproduction), when
genetic changes occur, that they are at their
most relevant, when considering any pos-
sible transformation. These changes man-
ifest themselves once they start to exhibit
genetic differences from their progenitors;
however, what I am talking about here are
previous changes in the metabolic machin-
ery. The cell is transformed, grows, and,
before multiplying, changes. Consequently,
this is not just about genetic changes; it is
also about changes in the cell’s metabolism
(de Lorenzo, 2014). Contrary to cars, that
cannot avoid wear and tear, cells are under-
going metabolic changes to avoid obsoles-
cence up to a point. A microbial cell is
usually said to be immortal, in that before
it ceases to exist in that form, it has already
divided. And in a multicellular organism,
with specialized reproductive cells, it is usu-
ally these cells themselves that join with
the reproductive cells of other organisms,
having previously undergone meiosis, in
order to reproduce. Yet, all of these differ-
ent types of cells – the immortal microbial
cells, the germ cells that have the capacity to
reproduce, and all the other non-germ cells
that undergo mitosis – transform meta-
bolically, before reaching their respective
points of division and reproduction. And
these changes, which are quite noticeable
and dramatic, can be crucial. So much
so that they may end the very life of the
corresponding entities before division or
reproduction can take place. All of these
cells have a lifespan that has been opti-
mized, through evolution, to ensure that
they reach the point of division or repro-
duction, whichever is relevant. We can,
it seems, only take the metaphor of the
cell as car so far. There is something that
does not quite fit, because eventually cars
become obsolete and end up in the scrap-
yard, whereas cells, even though they have a
limited lifespan, and undergo transforma-
tion and decomposition eventually, are able
to reproduce. They arrive, it would seem, at
these stages, with a certain degree of auton-
omy. The higher autonomy displayed by
living systems has its basis in their inter-
nal organizational dynamics, that is, in the
fact that cells (and organisms in general)
are self-maintaining, self-organizing, self-
repairing, and self-reproducing systems
(Nicholson, 2013). It is these properties
that confer organisms a far greater degree
of functional autonomy when compared to
machines. The metaphor of the car would
only be valid if it were possible to extend
the lifespan of its component parts and if,
by means of systematic repair, the car con-
tinued to be the same car that rolled off
the assembly line. In order for the car to
remain the same, intervention must take
place. And here is where we come to our
second observation, the biological entity –
in order to remain the same and reach the
point of division or reproduction – effects
its own intervention, regulating itself by
means of its metabolism. All of evolution –
more than 3000 million years of cease-
less effort – has conspired to ensure that
this self-driven intervention of single-cell
organisms, which divide, and multicellular
organisms, which have cells that divide and
others that reproduce, is effective; in other
words, ensuring that the transformations
that take place as a result of these organisms
being in permanent interaction with their
environment do not do so to such an extent
that they cause them to decompose or
degenerate before they can divide or repro-
duce (Danchin, 2009). The obsolescence
of a cell is remedied by self-intervention,
whereas the wear and tear of a car is exter-
nally remedied. The crucial difference with
regards to intervention seems to be that cars
require external intervention to remain
viable and operational whereas cells have
internal means of repairing damaged parts
and compensating against external pertur-
bations. This observation, which I consider
to be crucial, and which I have formulated
with regard to biological entities, must be
kept in mind when considering synthetic-
biological entities. Because even when cars
become obsolescent, and their obsoles-
cence can be remedied through interven-
tion, biological entities more or less remedy
their own obsolescence by effecting their
own intervention.
If a synthetic-biological entity is, by def-
inition, a biological entity, it will resist
obsolescence autonomously, or much more
autonomously than a car might (Nichol-
son, 2013). It would only fail to do so
if, focusing on the synthetic part of the
entity, we were to introduce some types
of control that might prevent this natural
dynamic. I cannot, however, conceive of
another way of controlling the biological
entity that is not based on absolute knowl-
edge of the entity. In other words, inter-
vention into the biological entity or, fail-
ing that, manufacturing a biological entity
from biological components, i.e., creating
a synthetic-biological entity, differs funda-
mentally from the case of the entity we
refer to as a car. Every aspect of the latter
is designed, right from the start. By con-
trast, the biological entity is not designed,
and our knowledge of how it functions is
in no way complete. This being the case, we
find ourselves in uncharted territory, not
that I wish to suggest that we are in com-
pletely uncharted territory, or that there is
no way to control what we are dealing with.
There exist various controls of and external
interventions into the entity itself, which
may render said entity controllable, or per-
haps, I should say, increasingly control-
lable, rather than totally controllable. The
synthetic-biological entity is preceded by a
biological entity which, as an autonomous
system in the process of evolution, requires
a certain level of knowledge in order for its
self-effected interventions to be controlled
(Serrano, 2007).
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
This work was supported by projects
SAF2012-31187 from the Minis-
terio de Ciencia e Innovación,
PrometeoII/2014/065 from the General-
itat Valenciana, Spain, and ST-FLOW from
the European Commission. The author
acknowledges comments of the reviewer to
improve the manuscript.
REFERENCES
Danchin, A. (2009). Bacteria as computers making
computers. FEMS Microbiol. Rev. 33, 3–26. doi:10.
1111/j.1574-6976.2008.00137.x
de Lorenzo, V. (2014). From the selfish gene to selfish
metabolism: revisiting the central dogma. Bioessays
36, 226–235. doi:10.1002/bies.201300153
Endy, D. (2005). Foundations for engineering biology.
Nature 438, 449–453. doi:10.1038/nature04342
Moya, A. (2014). The Calculus of Life. New York:
Springer Verlag (in press).
Nicholson, D. J. (2013). Organisms 6= machines. Stud.
Hist. Philos. Biol. Biomed. Sci. 44, 669–678. doi:10.
1016/j.shpsc.2013.05.014
Serrano, L. (2007). Synthetic biology: promises and
challenges (editorial). Mol. Syst. Biol. 3, 158. doi:
10.1038/msb4100202
Conflict of Interest Statement: The author declares
that the research was conducted in the absence of any
commercial or financial relationships that could be
construed as a potential conflict of interest.
Frontiers in Bioengineering and Biotechnology | Synthetic Biology November 2014 | Volume 2 | Article 59 | 2
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Moya Differences between natural and artificial entities
Received: 20 October 2014; accepted: 11 November 2014;
published online: 26 November 2014.
Citation: Moya A (2014) Obsolescence and inter-
vention: on synthetic-biological entities. Front.
Bioeng. Biotechnol. 2:59. doi:10.3389/fbioe.2014.00
059
This article was submitted to Synthetic Biology, a
section of the journal Frontiers in Bioengineering and
Biotechnology.
Copyright © 2014 Moya. This is an open-access article
distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons
Attribution License (CC BY). The use, distribution or
reproduction in other forums is permitted, provided the
original author(s) or licensor are credited and that the
original publication in this journal is cited, in accordance
with accepted academic practice. No use, distribution or
reproduction is permitted which does not comply with
these terms.
www.frontiersin.org November 2014 | Volume 2 | Article 59 | 3
